Just Do It!? Protecting Advertising Slogans in China Part II

By Jiang Ling, Partner, King & Wood's Trademark Department

The term "works" used and protected under the Copyright Law refers to original intellectual creations in the literary, artistic and the scientific domain, in so far as they are capable of being reproduced in a certain tangible form. As for literal works, this refers to the works manifested in text form, no matter how long it is or what type or format of literature it uses. As long as it is original, it should be within the scope of protection by the PRC Copyright Law (as well as Trademarks as previously discussed). Therefore, it can be concluded that an advertising slogan is in principle not excluded from copyright protection on the condition that it is original. However, the Copyright Law does not define what "original" is. Judging by judicial practice, the expression of original works may not necessarily be unprecedented, and re-creation based on previous intellectual works of others is not forbidden either. In general, works possess originality as long as it is created by the author independently rather than plagiarizing others' works which bears some personalized characteristics. Thus, it is possible for slogans to be copyrighted.

 

In practice, there are some instances in which advertising slogans are granted copyright protection. For example, in the case of Cheng Du Huangchenglaoma restaurant vs. Beijing Huangronglaoma hotpot restaurant, the court held that the slogans used by the plaintiff possessed the originality to qualify as a literal work and thus should be protected under the copyright law. Accordingly, the defendant infringed on the copyrights of the plaintiff in using the same slogans during its daily business. As to how to judge the originality of advertising slogans, the court specifically made the following analysis and statement on the verdict, " 'original' mentioned in the copyright law means that the works are created by the author independently without plagiarism or imitation, which is mainly manifested in the selection, design and composition of certain material. Although the vocabulary which comprises the slogans was not original, through the plaintiff's selection, combination and arrangement, they have reflected certain personalized characters.

Moreover, if advertising slogan has become a symbol or identifier of the company through long-term use and promotion, hence closely associated with the goodwill and the products of the company, it may also seek protection under the Anti-unfair Competition Law against other party's unauthorized use.

Conclusion

In fierce market competition, companies tend to promote their brand and products by adopting unique advertising slogans. Advertising slogans could become a symbolic sign of the company and thereby attain an intangible value just like a trademark. Under the existing legislation and in practice, advertising slogans can 1) be protected under the Trademark Law through trademark registration, as long as it is original and could function as a source indicator. 2) slogans that have built a connection with certain enterprises in the course of business should also fall within the protection scope of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law. 3) original advertising slogans may also be protected under the Copyright Law. Among the three, trademark registration is the most effective means of protection.
 

In Defense of the Coke Haiyuan Decision

The Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (“MOFCOM”) made the decision to prohibit the proposed acquisition of China Huiyuan Juice Group Limited by the Coca-Cola Company (the “Transaction”) under Article 28 of the Anti-Monopoly Law of People’s Republic of China (the “AML’). We believe the following three negative influences on competition were the primary considerations taken into account by MOFCOM:

 

Susan Ning, Partner, International Trade

 

Negative influences on the market due to Coke’s existing dominant position in the carbonated drink market

MOFCOM believed that after the completion of the Transaction, Coca-Cola would have had the ability to leverage its dominant position in the carbonated drink market in the juice drink market.

The ability to leverage is where an operator has a dominant position in a certain market and by taking advantages of its current dominant position, it is also able to obtain a new dominant position in a similar product market through tie-ins or bundle sales, imposing exclusive trading conditions, or other methods.

As Coca-Cola may have a dominant position in the carbonated drink market, MOFCOM believed that after the Transaction, Coca-Cola may (i) tie or bundle in Coca Cola’s juice drinks by utilizing its customers’ preferences in its carbonated drink, or tie its carbonated drink in as a means of promotion when selling juice drink; (ii) by offering discounts or refunds, encourage carbonated drink retailers to purchase a large number of its juice drinks, or limit their purchase and distribution of juice drinks manufactured by other competitors; (iii) increase sales volumes of its juice drink and supplant other juice drink products by taking advantage of its current sales channels, for example, its in-store refrigeration units installed at down-stream retailers.

Dominant market position in a certain market may be leveraged in adjacent or other closely related markets, which has already raised competition concerns by authorities in other jurisdictions. For instance, according to the decision made by the Australia Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) of the acquisition of Berri Limited (Berri) by Coco-Cola Amatil Limited’s (CCA) on October 8, 2003, ACCC believed that CCA would have the ability and incentive to leverage its market power in CSD (carbonated soft drinks) to increase distribution of Berri’s FB (chilled and ambient fruit juice and fruit drinks) product to the exclusion of rivals in the non-grocery trade channels.

Coke’s ability to impede market entry by controlling brands

Through review, MOFCOM believed that the brand is a key factor that influences effective competition in the drink market, that is, among other factors which may influence competition, such as capital and technology, the brand is considered one of the most important as opposed to other industries where technology may be more important. New entrants may not successfully gain market share in that it is difficult for them to obtain consumers’ recognition of their brands, even though they own certain technologies, facilities and capital. Coca-Cola may also restrain new market entrants by using its dominant position in the carbonated drink market as well as the leverage effect.

Accordingly, MOFCOM believed that after completion of the Transaction, Coca-Cola would have significantly stronger power to control the juice market by controlling two famous juice brands: “Meizhiyuan” and “Huiyuan”, as well as using its dominant position in the carbonated drink market. Therefore, the Transaction would significantly increase obstacles for potential competitors to enter the juice drink market from the prospective of branding.

The negative influences of the proposed concentration over small and medium operators and for the competition within the industry

MOFCOM believed that the Transaction would reduce survivability of domestic small and medium juice manufacturing enterprises, inhibit the ability of domestic enterprises to compete in the juice drink market, and harm the effective competition structure in the China juice drink market.

MOFCOM may have also believed that in the juice drink market, Coca-Cola and Huiyuan are direct competitors and therefore after the completion of the Transaction, Huiyuan, as an important and competent competitor, will no longer exist, which may lead to an increase of concentration. In addition, after the Transaction, Coca-Cola may soon gain a new dominant position by better utilizing Huiyuan’s current purchasing channels for raw materials, distribution channels of products, manufacturing equipment, market share, brand effects, and other advantages, as well as the leverage effects resulting from its dominant position in the carbonated drink market. Therefore, it could be concluded that the Transaction may negatively impact small and medium operators and may have a bad influence on the competition structure of juice drink industry and its further development.
 

Intersect Between Intellectual Property Law And Competition Law

At first glance, the goals of intellectual property law and competition law might appear to conflict. IPR owners are granted statutory rights to control access and charge monopoly rents to others for use of their rights. IPR owners may also use terms of IPR licences to regulate downstream activities of their distributors, such as imposing exclusivity, territorial restraints and price restraints. Competition law, on the other hand, is directed at curtailing such market power which may prove harmful to economic welfare.

 However, IP laws and competition laws can also be seen as complementary rather than antagonistic. Both laws share the same fundamental goals of enhancing consumer welfare and promoting innovation. According to the United States (US) Department of Justice (DoJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) :

 “…[competition] laws protect robust competition in the marketplace, while intellectual property laws protect the ability to earn a return on the investments necessary to innovate. Both spur competition among rivals to be the first to enter the marketplace with a desirable technology, product, or service.”

 While an IPR may confer a “legal monopoly” over a product, process or work, it does not necessarily confer an “economic monopoly”. Further, while an IP license may well confer restraints on licensees (such as territorial restraints) with respect to a specific product, process or work, there may be sufficient actual or potential close substitutes that constrain the exercise of market power by the IPR owner.

 Despite the view that the goals of IP and competition laws are complementary, difficult questions can arise when competition law is applied to specific activities involving IPRs.

 

A. China's AML:  Article 55

 The IPR provision in the AML is set out in Article 55:


“This law shall not apply to the conduct of operators to exercise their intellectual property rights in accordance with the laws and relevant administrative regulations on intellectual property rights; however, this law shall apply to the conduct of operators to eliminate or restrict market competition by abusing their intellectual property rights.”

 

 Article 55 exempts conduct which amounts to an exercise of IPRs so long as:  those IPRs are exercised in accordance with the provisions of laws and administrative regulations relating to IPRs; and the conduct does not amount to an abuse of IPRs by eliminating or restricting competition.

 The Article 55 approach is very similar to the approaches in Australia and Canada. In both these countries, there has been debate about when the IPR owner is only fairly exercising their inherent rights in the IPR or is trying to achieve something more which has an anti-competitive outcome. Experiences in both countries show that this dividing line can be difficult to draw.

 

* Angie Ng is a graduate in the Competition and Regulatory Group at Gilbert + Tobin in Sydney, Australia.

** Ding Liang is of counsel for King & Wood's International Trade Practice in Beijing.

*** Peter Waters is a partner in the Competition and Regulatory Group at Gilbert + Tobin in Sydney, Australia.

King & Wood established a strategic alliance with Gilbert + Tobin in November 2007.
 

B. IPRs and abuse of dominance

Article 55 also subjects the exercise of IPRs to the abuse of dominance conduct rule (Article 17 of the AML). This is similar to the approaches of the competition laws of the US, Singapore, EU and Australia.

The key phrase is “abusing… intellectual property rights”. However, this phrase has not been defined in the AML.

This phrase, is, however used in Article 40 of the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Article 40(2) may shed some light in relation to the AML phrase “abuse of intellectual property rights”:
“…nothing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from specifying in their legislation licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market …a Member may [however] adopt, consistently with the other provisions of this Agreement, appropriate measures to prevent or control such practices, which may include for example exclusive grantback conditions, conditions preventing challenges to validity and coercive package licensing, in the light of the relevant laws and regulations of that Member.”

China acceded to the WTO in 2001 and as such has an obligation to comply with all WTO agreements including TRIPS. In paragraph 286 of the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, some members of the Working Party expressed some concern as to the compatibility of China's rules on control of anti-competitive licensing practices or conditions with the corresponding obligations under Article 40 of TRIPS. Notably, the representative of China stated in response that China's legislation would comply with these obligations. The representative of China stated that these rules would apply across the board to all intellectual property rights. The Working Party on the Accession of China took note of this commitment. Hence, there is some suggestion that Article 55 of the AML may not stray too far from Article 40(2) of TRIPS.

On October 11, 2007, the European Communities raised the following question with China during a WTO Council for TRIPS meeting: “…[t]he EC welcomes the recently adopted Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law. This new legislation refers to the concept of ‘abuse of intellectual property rights’ in particular in Article 55. Can China clarify what this concept means in practice? Can China confirm that this concept does not go beyond what the TRIPS Agreement considers as abusive practices under Article 31(k) (compulsory licensing) and Article 40 (competition)?” This question may be indicative of concerns from other WTO members as to whether China will ignore Article 40 of the TRIPS Agreement when defining the term “abuse of intellectual property rights”.

Dominant entities exercising IPRs may still have to be concerned about the following provisions: (a) the prohibition against refusal to deal (without justification) ; (b) the prohibition against exclusive dealing (without justification) ; (c) the prohibition against tying ; and (d) the prohibition against applying differential treatment to parties . In a typical IP licence, it is common to find tying and exclusive dealing provisions. It is also common for IPR owners to refuse to deal with certain entities for various reasons.

Given that no guidelines or regulations have been issued in relation to the AML, there is much uncertainty as to how the dominance provisions (or the rest of the other provisions) of the AML will operate.

In relation to Article 55, the following questions arise: Should dominant entities (exercising IPRs) be subject to the same competition scrutiny as dominant entities selling other goods or services? Or would Chinese competition regulators apply a different standard in relation to IP licences and assignments, in recognition of the fact that IP differs from all other forms of property? Does the Chinese government intend for there to be transitional provisions in relation to the AML? Will the AML apply to IP licences and assignments entered into after 1 August 2008 (the date in which the AML will come into effect) or will it apply retrospectively to IP licences and assignments entered into before 1 August 2008?

C. The Article 15 “improving technology, research and new products” exception

If entities are somehow not able to get their IP related agreements exempt from the AML pursuant to Article 55, then there is a possibility that these agreements may be exempt pursuant to Article 15. Specifically, Article 15 of the AML exempts certain categories of agreements from the “monopoly agreements” conduct rule (located in Article 13 and 14). However, it is important to note that Article 15 does not exempt an agreement from the abuse of dominant position conduct rule (located in Article 17).

The most relevant Article 15 exemption in relation to IP related agreements is the “improving technology, research and new products” exception located in Article 15(1). Specifically, Article 15(1) exempts agreements made “for the purpose of improving technology, researching and developing new products” from the monopoly agreements conduct rule.

The EU has a similar exemption in the form of a block exemption entitled “categories of research and development agreements”. However, in order for an agreement to fall under the EU block exemption, there are several conditions which need to be fulfilled, including the condition that, if the agreement only provides for joint research and development but excludes joint exploitation of the results, then each party conducting the research must be free to exploit the results and any necessary pre-existing know-how independently. In addition, agreements exempt under this block exemption are immune from competition law only for a limited period of time (usually 7 years) and the market share of the participant undertakings must not exceed a particular threshold (for non-competing undertakings, the threshold is 25%).

It is unclear whether the Article 15 exemption will apply in a similar way as the EU’s “categories of research and development agreements” block exemption.

There are still many grey areas to iron out in relation to Article 55 and Article 15 of the AML. Hopefully guidelines or regulations, which are able to shed light on some of the issues and questions above, will be issued before the AML comes into effect.