补充申报债权相关问题研究

金杜律师事务所破产、重组和清算
 
《企业破产法》规定了债权的补充申报问题,该法第五十六条规定:“在人民法院确定的债权申报期限内,债权人未申报债权的,可以在破产财产最后分配前补充申报;但是,此前已进行的分配,不再对其补充分配。为审查和确认补充申报债权的费用,由补充申报人承担。债权人未依照本法规定申报债权的,不得依照本法规定的程序行使权利。”

   笔者认为,上述规定对于债权的补充申报仍然不够具体明确,有必要在此进行一些初步的探讨。

      一、补充申报债权的费用
      根据《企业破产法》的规定,为审查和确认补充申报债权的费用,由补充申报人承担。笔者认为该笔费用应仅限于依破产程序审查和确认补充申报债权所实际发生的费用,而不得随意收取或者按照一般诉讼案件的标准收费。同时需要注意的是,根据《企业破产法》的规定,有些在破产案件受理后的债权也属于破产债权,比如在管理人行使合同解除权后,对方当事人由此而产生的损害赔偿请求权等。这些种类的债权有可能无法在法院规定的申报期间内申报,但该种情况下的补充申报并非债权人自身过错造成,由其承担补充申报的费用是不合理的,所以该笔费用应当纳入破产费用而无需债务人单独支付。
      二、补充申报债权的核查
      根据《企业破产法》的规定,申报债权的核查工作应在债权人会议上进行,那么对于补充申报的债权是否也应如此呢?笔者认为,一般情况下,债权人会议的召集成本都比较高,如果对每一笔补充申报的债权都不分数额大小,都依照程序召集债权人会议来逐笔核查,显然,破产成本就会很大,对于大多数债权人的利益也会造成一定的损害。因此,笔者认为,当债权人补充申报的债权数额不大时,可以考虑不召开债权人会议,而采取其他替代性方式核查债权,比如将补充申报的债权材料发给各债权人进行书面核查,由管理人负责解决核查中出现的问题。
      三、补充申报债权的最后期限
      根据《企业破产法》的规定,补充申报债权的最后期限为“破产财产最后分配前”。而对于清算、重整、和解三种破产程序来说,该期限也有区别,需明确予以界定。

      在破产清算程序中,笔者认为,债权人补充申报债权的最后期限应为破产财产最终分配方案提交债权人会议表决之前。如果在会议表决之后仍然允许债权人补充申报,那么之前的财产分配方案就要将补充申报的债权纳入,从而做出相应修改,导致债权人会议的相关决议就失去效力,甚至人民法院关于确认财产分配方案的裁定都要作废,这必然会造成破产程序的延误,加大破产成本,损害绝大多数债权人的利益,损害法律威严。同样道理,在和解和重整程序中,债权人补充申报债权的最后期限应为和解协议草案或重整计划草案提交债权人会议表决之前。

      此外,如果进入和解或重整程序后,由于某些原因,法院又依法终止债务人和解协议或重整计划的执行,宣告债务人破产并转入破产清算程序,这时,相应的,债权人补充申报债权的最后期限是最终分配方案提交债权人会议表决前,所以,笔者认为,在和解或重整程序转为清算程序后,之前未进行申报的债权人仍有权利在清算程序中继续补充申报债权。(化难)

The Best of a Bad Deal

From 2003-2007, over US$100 billion poured into China via offshore structures in tax havens like the Cayman Islands. Much came from global institutional investors who tasked alternative investment managers with allocating a percentage of their portfolios to high-yield opportunity funds, emerging markets and real estate.

Everyone wanted a piece of the “China Dream,” but in recent months they have woken up to deteriorating economic conditions. Institutional investors are forcing redemptions of their investments from high-yield, high-risk markets.

 

Jack Rodman, Senior Advisor to King & Wood\'s International Debt/Restructuring Practice

Summarized from Mr. Rodman's article for China Economic Review, May 2009.

Given China's resilience to the financial crisis, it seemed a good place to meet redemptions and liquidity needs by selling positions. However, it was much easier to get money into China than to get it out.

Beijing has long been wary of foreign investors, imposing strict controls on FDI and offshore loans. Unable to resist GDP growth, renminbi appreciation and real estate expansion, investors wanted in – keen to avoid regulatory processes and wanting exit strategies. Offshore structuring appeared as a solution, but this was conceived against the bubbling real estate market – where much of the foreign money was headed.

I warned investors that 1 billion square feet of residential and commercial projects were underway in Beijing alone. But local banks and foreign funds provided cash; developers continued to build. The government tried to rein in a runaway market. The lending spigot at local banks ended, interest rates and down payment requirements increased and anti-speculation taxes were imposed. The bubble began to burst, with markets in south China suffering first. Developers, undeterred, bought more land and continued building. Their ambitions finally caught up with them last year.

China's listed real estate developers have seen their share prices fall by 80% from November 2007. Despite government efforts to revive the residential market, buyers are only responding to price cuts. Many of these developers are hemorrhaging cash, turning to non-banks and gray market lenders.

The unlisted firms have caused the most trouble. An IPO promised riches and so these developers expanded aggressively. They needed capital; foreign investors acquiesced. Investments were structured offshore and the money came onshore via preferred equities and convertible bonds issued by offshore companies with real estate holding companies in China.

Many large developers missed IPO deadlines, facing disgruntled investors. Alternative investment managers now face redemptions from investors and busted covenants and debt defaults from Chinese developers.

It seems, from the offer¬ing circulars, that few of the investors or developers knew what they were getting into. The developers gave guarantees, pledged unlisted shares, issued “no-IPO put options”. They agreed to pay punitive escalating internal rates of return, going from 30% to 70%, if the IPO was delayed by 18- 30 months.

The alternative investment managers who relied on “contractual” guarantees to protect their interests overlooked the clause in the circulars which states that offshore creditor rights are not enforceable in Chinese courts. Neither are judgments in foreign courts binding on Chinese corporations or citizens.

Many of the international law firms that developed these structures are now advising clients not to enter Chinese litigation. Yet they recognize that by the time the offshore judicial process concludes, Chinese developers would have transferred assets with any unencumbered value, or allowed onshore creditors to slap asset preservation orders on any remaining assets.
The international law firms are too pessimistic. Foreign investors can use the Chinese legal system to enforce their offshore creditor rights, seize collateral, freeze assets to keep them from disappearing, enforce guarantees and bring Chinese entrepreneurs to negotiate.

Most Chinese real estate developers sleep soundly yet foreigners remain engrossed in inconclusive meetings trying to answer their investors’ questions:
• What is the status of my investment in China and what is the condition of the Chinese partner?
• Is the original investment strategy still viable in the present climate?
• Should I continue to hold, sell or invest additional capital and if so is there a realistic business plan I can evaluate?
• If I continue to hold or invest is there a way to get closer to the company and its assets onshore to remedy some defects inherent in offshore structures?
• How do I limit my liability and is there a plan to get my capital out of China?
• Are my interests and those of the alternative investment manager still aligned?

My advice to foreign investors is: act now. Chinese business partners will inevitably satisfy local creditors first, unhesitatingly encumbering a foreign investor's secured assets. Investors must rectify the defects in their offshore structures so they can use local courts and rely on Chinese litigation to settle with local partners.

The end game is to develop a capital preservation and exit strategy, leading to an informed decision to invest, sell or stay the course.
 

Debt Restructuring -- Second Life for a Distressed Company

By: Liu Yanling, Partner and head of King & Wood's Bankruptcy, Restructuring & Insolvency Practice

Stellar Megaunion Corporation ("SMC") was in serious debt, as it could barely repay its liabilities. New World China Land ("NWCL"), which was seeking an opportunity to go public, proposed to acquire SMC as a shell company which has no assets, but is publicly listed. To achieve this goal, NWCL conducted several rounds of negotiations with SMC's creditors to settle SMC's debts and clear the roadblocks for the acquisition. However, the parties were unable to make much progress in the negotiations due to the large number of SMC's creditors involved. As SMC needed to solve its debt crisis as soon as possible and its negotiations with NWCL were deadlocked, the company decided to reorganize to completely release itself from the heavy debt burdens in a short period time.



A. Reorganization initiated by SMC's creditors
As SMC failed to repay it debts due, a third party creditor petitioned the proper Intermediate People's Court (the "Court") to reorganize SMC. The Court accepted the petition on March 11, 2008 ([2008] Yusanzhongbozi No.1).

SMC's Reorganization


B. Confirmation of Creditors' Rights
According to the proposed reorganization plan the administrator of SMC (the "Administrator") submitted to the Court and the first SMC creditors' meeting, 70 creditors filed claims and the total value of confirmed claims was nearly RMB 2.5 billion. [continue reading to find out the outcome]
 

 

C. The Reorganization Plan
The Administrator proposed the following reorganization based on SMC's financial status and characteristics.
 

a. SMC would repay the secured creditors with the asset(s) over which the security was created. Where the asset(s) is converted into cash, the corresponding secured creditor enjoys priority of repayment and a cash payment equivalent of 30% of the principal of the secured claim would be paid to the secured creditor.
 

b. The employees' claims and tax claims should be paid in full.
 

c. The unsecured creditors should be repaid 30% of the principal of the unsecured claims.
 

d. The shareholders of non-tradable shares of SMC transferred 50% of their equity shares they held to an outside company in Shanghai as consideration for funding SMC's cash repayment to its creditors. Up to 40 million of the non-tradable shares were transferred to the Shanghai company could be converted into cash at RMB 5/share and used to repay the creditors. The secured and unsecured creditors may apply in writing for repayment from SMC on a voluntary basis.
 

e. SMC then transfers all its existing assets (excluding those over which secured claims were created) to a Corporate Management and Consultancy company ("CCCMC") as consideration for CCCMC to repay the remaining claims outstanding upon cash repayment by the Shanghai company and the stock repayment for non-tradable shares.
 

On April 18, 2008, SMC convened the first creditors meeting and the Administrator submitted the proposed reorganization plan to the Court and to a creditors meeting for to vote. The plan was passed during the meeting and approved by the Court.
 

The Reorganized SMC
Upon the completion of the reorganization, SMC repaid claims of RMB 560 million and the creditors discharged claims of RMB 1.9 billion in total. All the assets and the outstanding portion of the creditors' claims were transferred to CCCMC. SMC was released from the said portion of liabilities and became a shell company without any assets or liabilities.
 

Compared with the reorganization of other listed companies, the reorganization of SMC had its own features. First, SMC's reorganization timeframe was short — the proceeding was concluded within 41 days from the day the Court accepted the reorganization petition. Second, SMC utilized shares, a fictitious “currency”, to fund a portion of cash repayment under the reorganization plan. This approach not only lowers the cost to the Shanghai company that assumed shares, but also provides reasonable compensation for SMC's creditors with the reevaluation of the company shares upon further asset restructuring.


The Importance of Reorganization for Listed Companies
By April 30, 2008, more than 10 listed companies in China had completed their reorganizations. Reorganization offers those companies that face a debt crisis due to their poor operation an opportunity of survival. To distressed public companies, reorganization is not only a means to gain a second life but also a tool to better protect their creditors and shareholders, alleviate the unemployment pressures of their employees, and stabilize the local economy.


As the most efficient method to solve a debt crisis, reorganization has been increasingly used in the debt restructuring of listed companies. It is also the most popular approach for parties to release the debt burden of a target company in merger and acquisition transactions in China.
Compared with other conciliation proceedings, reorganization has some advantages.

First, reorganization is time efficient. The company under reorganization does not need to negotiate with each of its creditors. The reorganization can be adopted with the consent of the majority of the creditors. Even if the creditors in a certain voting group rejects a proposed plan, the court may rule approve it if certain requirements are met.

Second, reorganization has a better chance of success. So far, no company has entered bankruptcy proceedings following an unsuccessful reorganization.

Third, as the number of companies qualified for becoming a shell company is small, more and more investors with substantial financial strength prefer to acquire shell companies via reorganization. Reorganization can lower the investment costs by alleviating the debt burden of the distressed company and repaying a portion of the creditors' claims with the stocks of the company and leave the investors with more funds for further asset restructuring.

Fourth, once the reorganization plan is approved by the court, the plan is binding on all creditors. This ensures that the distressed company is completely free from further claims by the creditors and becomes a shell company.


As an effective means of saving distressed companies and conducting debt restructuring in M&A transactions, reorganization creates a new mechanism that benefits all stakeholders of distressed companies.