China M&A: Assembling an Effective Team for a China Transaction Part II

By Mark Schaub, Partner, Corporate, King & Wood Shanghai

Most companies engaging in a China project will likely need support from external consultants. However, selecting the external team is often more difficult than assembling the internal team — who do you need? How do you find good ones? And what role should they play? This portion highlights the infamous China consultant. What kind of role do they play and do you actually need them?

The unsuspecting foreign investor will be surprised to find how helpful everyone is in China. Indeed, it often seems that China's biggest sector after manufacturing is consulting service in relation to China. A Google search of “China consultants” resulted in over 20 million results.  Googling “ethical consultants in China” resulted in two million results — more than expected!).

One of the reasons that multinationals do relatively well in China is the depth of their management. Medium-sized companies will often need external support for their China projects, and there are so many consultants to choose from in a myriad variety of types and sizes. The usual suspects (ie types of consultants) are listed below.

The China Consultant — Jack of all Trades
“Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” — Winston Churchill
“China is much more complicated than that!” — China consultant

The China Consultant can be a blessing to an inexperienced China investor. However, it is extremely important to choose one that understands you and what you wish to do. Further, it is important to ensure that the investor remains deeply involved in the project — responsibility cannot be outsourced. If it is your investment project and it fails, it will not help to blame the hired hands, ie the consultants.

The generalist China consultant — the “zhongguo tong” or old China hand can play an important role.

In many cases, these consultants have little knowledge (many people believe the sentence could end at this point) far less than the client of the industry in which the client is operating. They rely to a great degree on their “China knowledge” and “guanxi”.

China is clearly different in many ways from Europe or the US. However, it is not the unfathomable enigma made out by many China consultants. Naturally unscrupulous consultants wish to make China more mysterious than it actually is in order to maintain their role in a project. If a consultant states to you that he is a crucial part of the project (as opposed to becoming crucial by doing a good job), well then, it is probably time to find a different consultant.

However, it would be unfair to dismiss the China consultants out of hand. Consultants can and do play important roles. It is important for foreign investors to select a consultant with whom they feel comfortable and who can cover manpower or expertise shortcomings within their own organization.

Crucial criteria for selecting a consultant include:

The consultant has your interests at heart - For many consultants, it is not the success or failure of the project that matters, rather, it is whether the project proceeds that is important. In many cases, unscrupulous consultants prepare feasibility studies which have best case scenarios based on the assumption that “if every Chinese added one inch to his shirt tail”, and worst case scenarios which are only slightly less pessimistic, such as “if every Chinese added two-thirds of one inch to his shirt tail”.

Case study: The Intermediary
In the Harvard Business Review on Doing Business with China (Graham, John L. and Lam, N. Mark, “The Chinese Negotiation”, in Harvard Business Review on Doing Business in China (Boston MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2004).), an article entitled “Chinese Negotiation” by John L. Graham and N. Mark Lam lays great importance on the role of the “intermediary” (zhongjian ren) (In Chinese: 中间人). Basically the intermediary is a person who can bridge the two sides and intercede when there is conflict. The authors advise that the intermediary plays an indispensable” role in such discussions:

“Only a native Chinese speaker can read and explain the moods, intonations, facial expressions, and body language Chinese negotiators exhibit during a formal negotiation session. Frequently only the zhongjian ren can determine what’s going on. … the zhongjian ren can step in because he is an interpreter not so much of words as of cultures.” (Graham, John L. and Lam, N. Mark, “The Chinese Negotiation”, in Harvard Business Review on Doing Business in China, p 41)

Experience, at least mine, has shown that if in order to communicate with the Chinese partner on the other side you need someone to analyse his “moods, intonations, facial expressions, and body language”, well, it is probably time to look for another Chinese partner who is less difficult to deal with. One should also bear in mind that the mission is not accomplished with the signing of a contract — it is the establishment of a successful project. At the time of project implementation, the zhongjian ren will no doubt be off brokering deals elsewhere while you will be sitting with Chairman Liu, trying to work out what he means when he crosses his arms and speaks with a slightly higher than normal lilt.

However, I may be wrong as John L. Graham and N. Mark Lam even helpfully provide an example of intermediary “magic”:

“Indeed, we have seen more than one zhongjian ren successfully deal with divisive disagreements. The following is one such case.

A vice president of a New York-based software company went to Beijing to negotiate a distribution contract with a Chinese research institute. Having attended meetings arranged by the intermediary — a former senior executive with the institute — the VP was pleased with the progress during the first two days. But on the third day, the two sides became embroiled in a fruitless debate over intellectual property rights. Feeling they were losing face, the Chinese ended the meeting. That night, the VP and the China country manager met with the intermediary. The following day, the intermediary called the head of the institute and worked his magic. In the end, both sides agreed that the intellectual property rights were to be jointly owned, and the contract was signed.” (Graham, John L. and Lam, N. Mark, “The Chinese Negotiation”, in Harvard Business Review on Doing Business in China, p 42)

And that indeed sums up the problems with using intermediaries in China.

Intermediaries normally convince the unsuspecting foreigner to agree to what the Chinese counterpart wants. The above passage even admits that the intermediary was “a former senior executive with the institute". It is unlikely that he would switch allegiance to the US company based on some nice dinners (according to the authors, “Expensive meals in nice places are key”). In my experience, the intermediary (especially one with links to the Chinese partner) grants the Chinese partner an enormous advantage in negotiations. The intermediary will allow the Chinese side to know what the foreign side is thinking and will normally push for the easiest way to an agreement. This is normally to convince the foreign partner that “this is China” and to agree to the proposal on the table.

The “magic” solution outlined above was that the New York software company agreed to joint ownership of the intellectual property rights of its software with a Chinese distributor. Leaving aside the fact that it would seem strange to grant a distributor intellectual property rights, the even greater question is: what was the “magic”? Did the Chinese distributor want sole ownership of the software? I do not think I would grant a distributor ownership of software.

The consultant is realistic about China and himself - Many China consultants have a vested interest in making China a mysterious, unfathomable, and almost dangerous place. Only with their guidance and even more importantly, their highly placed contacts, could your medium-sized company hope to navigate the behemoth which is China. This is obviously over the top. Some things are different in China, but most things that make sense overseas also make sense here. Contacts do help as is the case everywhere, but they are not the only factor.

In addition, one should be wary of consultants who claim “they have unrivalled contacts in China”, “my father was a foreign minister in post-liberation China” (indeed the writer has met three consultants who have made this claim — but they well have been telling the truth as they all proved to be crooks and may have been related) etc.

The consultant should not care too much - Naturally it is important for your consultant to care but it is also important that he does not care too much.

This can be best illustrated by the following case:

Case study: There is no place like Home

A company from Austria was interested in manufacturing cane chairs in China. Basically, the design was made in Austria. Cane would need to be sourced in China and some assembly work was required. The production would then be exported. All in all, a small project.

As the company was small and had little overseas experience, it came across an Austrian entrepreneur living in China. This Austrian entrepreneur had a factory located in Xiaoshi, a small village in Liaoning province in the Northeast of China. The Austrian entrepreneur had convinced the Austrian company that he was an extremely successful businessman in China and was running a number of factories very successfully. That this successful businessman was willing to take time out of his hectic schedule to assist in locating an ideal place to assemble some cane chairs did not seem to raise any alarm bells.

In any event, consult he did. The conservative Austrian company requested a feasibility study on the location of the facility. The Austrian consultant went off and conducted his investigation. Now, a layman may think that the obvious location for a small assembly plant for export would be near a port, a railway connection or some other form of transport. Alternatively, it would make sense to have the facility located near the raw materials.

You would be wrong. The feasibility report concluded that the perfect location for the assembly would be Xiaoshi — despite being located far from rail, sea or port; despite being four hours from the nearest airport; despite being possibly one of the only places in China where bamboo refuses to grow.

However, if the consultant surprised with the general location of the proposed facility, he was able to exceed all expectations in relation to the level of specification. The consultant had been able to pinpoint a factory on a street near his current factory. Further good news abounded in the feasibility study. In addition to finding an optimal assembly location, the consultant had been able to drum up support with the local party secretary. The report proudly stated that “Xiaoshi’s party secretary supports the establishment of a cane chair production facility”. In addition, he would give his support to the Austrian company to use the state-owned factory provided the Austrian company was able to meet certain investment and tax requirements. The consultant was also willing to take a share in the new venture to “smoothen things”.

The Austrian company decided to set up a simple assembly plant in Suzhou and has been successfully assembling and exporting chairs for several years without high-level political support.


 

China M&A: Assembling an Effective Team for a China Transaction Part I

By Mark Schaub, Partner, Corporate, King & Wood Shanghai

Many West European and US companies have thinned out their ranks of middle management in the never-ending pursuit of shareholder value. A China project is likely to be more time intensive and involved (and therefore expensive) than the foreign company initially forecasts. For this reason many foreign investors in China face difficulties in assembling a successful business project team to implement the project. Part I discusses the assembling of an effective in-house team.

Having an export manager deal with a China project on a part-time basis will mean that the project may have a lower priority than it deserves. Having a middle manager deal with a China project on a full-time basis and having his destiny interwoven with the China project (i.e. no China project = no job) may mean the deal will proceed regardless of whether it makes sense or not.

In the author's experience the most successful China project teams are indeed teams rather than individuals. Suitable team members will typically consist of an in-house team consisting of an executive-level member, a business development manager, an in-house lawyer and a technician; and normally external support including lawyers, accountants and consultants.

In-House Team

(1) Executive
Often in China, it is difficult to close a deal without the assistance of an executive-level negotiator from the head office. It can often be a mistake to bring such persons too early into the game as this demystifies them. Better to bring the high-level negotiator to close the last remaining open points rather than waste him on small wording issues.

(2) Business Development Manager/Project Manager
Projects without a dedicated project manager or business development manager tend to proceed slowly. Ideally, this person will not be the person to actually implement the project if it is a joint venture. This may appear at first glance to be counter-intuitive. However, experience shows that although a dedicated project manager is good, one that is too dedicated can be very bad.

Project managers who end up implementing the project (i.e. as General Manager) will tend to adopt a position of compromising too easily on important issues to the company and digging in the heels for items that, although less critical from a corporate view, may impact upon the General Manager. If the candidate for the General Manager is already clear, then it is useful to have him or her involved but not leading the discussions.

Case study: Our Friend François
An example of such an issue was with a French chief representative who was negotiating a joint venture for his company. François saw his very career being entwined with the formation of the joint venture as he would be the General Manager. The project was to be a 50/50 joint venture due to legal restrictions.

In the initial letter of intent, the parties had agreed that the French side would nominate the General Manager. However, as one may expect, during the actual negotiations of the detailed joint venture documentation the Chinese side wished to have a “veto” over the actual appointment. Sacré bleu! The Chinese side was sensitive to François’ obvious discomfort with the proposal which appeared to him to be a thinly veiled attack.

In order to smoothen our Gallic friend François’ ruffled feathers, the Chinese explained that it was not that they were against François as General Manager. No, François was their friend. No, François was a competent man. No, the problem was that the Joint Venture was to last for 20 years and their concern was whether François’ successor would be equally competent. François’ response (unfortunately heartfelt) was that they should not worry. It was clear that after his term as General Manager, he would return to France and have a board position in the headquarters and be responsible for Asia. Accordingly, the Chinese partner could rest assured that François would still be involved. It was a little difficult, but I felt it necessary to take François to one side and explain to him: “1. The Chinese partner is interested in doing the project with the company, not with you; and 2. they were only being polite — they do not really think you are competent.”

(3) In-house lawyer
A much maligned breed. For many project teams, the in-house lawyer represents the worst nightmare — the lawyer you cannot fire.

However, in-house legal counsels will often play an important role in a China project.

Their main advantages are: (1) they have a good understanding of the foreign company doing the project (i.e. what is feasible and what is not); (2) they can play an important role in ensuring that the proper headquarters’ resources are brought to bear as required; and (3) an often underrated advantage is that they are able to ensure that outside counsel remain focused on the project.

When the legal counsels are good, they can be very good for a project. However, occasionally one comes across in-house counsels that seem to block everything. As the Chinese saying goes: “A man who cannot say yes is useless, a man who cannot say no cannot be trusted” (不能说“是”的人没有用;不能说“不”的人信不过。). Some in-house lawyers from headquarters fall within the “cannot say yes” category.

There is one tried and true solution to such a dilemma — invite the in-house lawyer to attend negotiations in China. Most China project negotiations do not occur in metropolitan Shanghai or Beijing but in relatively remote areas. One trip will normally be enough to change the in-house lawyer's attitude from “No way, this is a crucial issue” to “OK, well if you cannot negotiate that point, I understand it is difficult to second guess negotiations when you are thousands of miles away (please God, do not make me go back to that hell hole)”.

(4) Technician
Almost all China projects have a technical or technological element. The technology is normally an integral part of the potential risk as well as being crucial to the project's success. Despite this almost all joint venture projects are negotiated without the participation of technicians. Input from technical staff is crucial in determining how to protect technology, assess what technology should flow into China, and also crucially, how to transfer technology to China.