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In a typical tender offer, a potential disagreement or disagreement between the shareholders and the board exists.  The shareholders may be lured by the offer of an investor and therefore intend to sell their equity in the target company at the price offered by the potential acquirer.  The board may believe the offer underestimates the value of the target company and refuses to approve the offer.  Diversified ownership structure means individual shareholder(s) cannot exercise decisive influence on the board.  Such ownership structures give management more independence.  When confronted by a hostile tender offer, the board of the target company often takes defensive measures by adopting resolutions or amending the bylaws of the target company, e.g. to control the timing of special shareholder meetings, control the procedure to replace directors, or to adopt the poison pill, etc.  Some shareholders who wish to sell may file derivative actions seeking injunctive relief, e.g. to declare the defensive measure illegal.  If the derivative action fails, the potential acquirer has to raise the price, or retreat.

 

In a typical tender offer, a potential disagreement or disagreement between the shareholders and the board exists. The shareholders may be lured by the offer of an investor and therefore intend to sell their equity in the target company at the price offered by the potential acquirer. The board may believe the offer underestimates the value of the target company and refuses to approve the offer. Diversified ownership structure means individual shareholder(s) cannot exercise decisive influence on the board. Such ownership structures give management more independence. When confronted by a hostile tender offer, the board of the target company often takes defensive measures by adopting resolutions or amending the bylaws of the target company, e.g. to control the timing of special shareholder meetings, control the procedure to replace directors, or to adopt the poison pill, etc. Some shareholders who wish to sell may file derivative actions seeking injunctive relief, e.g. to declare the defensive measure illegal. If the derivative action fails, the potential acquirer has to raise the price, or retreat.


The above scenario typically requires the following factors to initiate a hostile tender offer: (i) diversified ownership (which frees the management from individual or several shareholders’ control), (ii) an interventionist judiciary (willing to make determinations of whether defensive measures are lawful), and (iii) a set of relatively clear rules governing director's actions (that are applicable guidelines directors follow). From a more general perspective, flourishing privately owned enterprises and a market economy create fertile ground for hostile takeovers. Further relevant factors may be a legal environment that clearly defines corporate governance and a business culture of relatively transparent corporate governance.


n China, company ownership is rarely diversified. This difference stems from a difference in corporate structuring and checks on corporate governance. Private enterprises in China are often closely held companies, in which the shareholders have firm control of the board; while state owned enterprises are usually under the influence of administrative order. Thus directors do not serve as a “goal keeper” against hostile takeovers because the shareholders of the company will have already said “yes” to any offer. Furthermore, Chinese courts and legislators have not yet come to the question of the poison pill’s legality under Chinese law.


One explanation is an alternative deterrent to hostile takeovers in China. In lieu of the poison pill, most Chinese companies prevent hostile takeovers by using a “white knight”, i.e., another buyer who agrees to offer a higher price or better conditions. In fact, this mechanism has proven quite effective against hostile takeovers. In a Chinese limited liability company, the board has to abide by the articles of association and cannot amend the bylaws or articles of association to create a defensive measure without government approval. At the same time, the board consists of directors who represent the shareholders directly. Therefore, there is rarely a disagreement between the shareholders and the board of directors. As such, a situation that gives rise to a hostile takeover in the west does not exist to quite the same extent. However, with the development of the Chinese economy and greater flexibility in corporate governance, China may someday look to an alternative mechanism such as the poison pill.


 

中国为什么没有"毒丸计划"？

作者  李文博      国际贸易部 

2008年6月11日，金杜荣幸的邀请到美国并购领域著名律师事务所Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen and Katz的创始合伙人Martin Lipton先生前来交流访问。Lipton先生在金杜就法律从业以及毒丸计划的影响两个话题做了演讲。Lipton先生在法律实务领域成就卓越，最体现其智慧和创造力的无疑要数“权利计划”，即目标公司董事会采取的一系列反收购措施，用于抵御股权收购者低估目标公司价值的收购计划。由于此后华尔街银行家们的敌意收购计划由于“权利计划”屡屡受挫，因此他们称“权利计划”为“毒丸计划”。

    Lipton先生的演讲引起了我对此类防御措施在中国使用情况的兴趣。我随后在google上搜索了“毒丸计划”和“公司”这两个中文关键词，但却没有找到任何该措施在国内市场中运用的相关信息。为什么在中国没有“毒丸计划”呢？

    在典型的股权收购战中，股东和董事会之间经常会意见不一致：部分股东可能被收购人的要约报价所吸引而希望出售其所持有的目标公司股份，但董事会可能由于收购价格明显低于目标公司实际价值而拒绝收购。出现这种意见不一致的前提条件是分散的公司所有权结构，由于股东数量庞大，而每位股东持有的股权相对较少，单个股东或者几个股东的联合很难对董事会产生实质性影响。这种公司所有制形式使得公司管理层相对独立。当遇到敌意收购时，目标公司的董事会经常通过修改公司章程等形式采取防御措施，如：召开临时股东大会、更换董事、采取“毒丸计划”等等。随着收购战的继续展开，一些希望出卖股份的股东可能会通过派生诉讼寻求司法禁令，例如，要求宣布防御措施违法。如果派生途径失败，收购人则或者提高报价，或者退出收购战。可见，对于收购战的发起以及进行，以下的因素是很重要的：（i）分散的所有制结构（使得管理层便脱离了某个或某些股东的控制），（ii）司法的介入（以决定防御策略的合法性），（iii）公司法中对董事行为规范有较为明确的规定（作为董事行动的标准）。从一个更宏观的角度来说，私有企业兴旺发展和自由经济是收购战能够产生的土壤。另外，其他相关因素还包括较为清楚的公司治理法律环境以及要求公司治理透明的商业文化。

    而中国的情况则很不同。在中国，股东对公司的所有权较为集中。公司往往完全被私有企业所有，使得股东总是能牢牢地对董事会进行有效控制。在国营企业中企业则往往是在政府的影响下运营。在这种情形下，如果公司股东同意收购报价，公司董事会基本不会有反对意见。不仅如此，中国的法律以及司法机关对在收购战中董事行为合法性的审查标准的界定较为模糊，而在中国法律体制下对于“毒丸计划”这样的防御措施的合法性的也没有明确的规定。同时，政府的经济干预以及对个人意志自治的缺乏也会阻碍防御措施的实施。

    抛开“毒丸计划”，实践中更多中国公司使用“白骑士”（即，提出更高的交易价格和更优惠的交易条件的收购者）的策略来抵抗低价收购。这已被证实是非常有效的办法。在中国的有限责任公司中，董事会必须严格遵守公司章程，且不能在未得到政府批准的情况下为使某项防御措施生效而修改公司章程。同时，由董事会的董事们直接就是股东们的代表，因此，在董事会和股东间几乎不会存产生意见分歧。所以西方那样情形和程度的收购战在中国不会发生。然而，随着中国经济的私有化程度和企业管理体制的灵活性的提升，也许不久的将来“毒丸计划”也将会成为抵御敌意收购的一项有效措施。