Tom Shoesmith, 屈素瑞
Silicon Valley, 硅谷办公室
美国海外投资委员会（CFIUS）要求一家美国企业必须终止参与其与中国公司的合资项目，这是CFIUS首次做出该类指令。
2019年1月，一家在纳斯达克上市的医疗设备公司Ekso Bionics Holdings, Inc.（艾科索）宣布与浙江一家创业投资有限公司及另一家公司设立合资企业，以拓展机器人外骨骼产品在亚洲的研发、销售和售后支持。据报道，该美国公司计划为合资事业提供相关制造技术的技术许可及其中国注册专利技术，其他合资方提供资金支持。据EBH披露，该交易还涉及一项对EBH的投资计划。
CFIUS的审查范围包括“由任何外国主体进行、或者与任何外国主体共同进行的可能导致外国主体取得对任何美国业务（U.S. business）控制权”的一切交易，“包括通过设立合资企业进行的该等交易”。这意味着，对于合资企业而言，投资人应当注意避免向合资企业注入任何可能被认为构成“美国业务”的资产。
根据CFIUS法规，技术许可本身不构成美国业务。法规中提供这样一则示例：外国主体获取的一项装甲运兵车制造技术的技术许可不代表其取得了美国业务，即使该外国主体同时收购了美国技术许可方的装甲运兵车生产线。当然，任何技术许可还将受出口管制法规的审查，但这属于不同的法律问题。
另一方面，根据法规，为设立合资企业而聚集的“土地和设备……与知识产权、其他专有信息和无形资产”的组合可能构成美国业务。通常，美方人员的注入也可能引发问题。如果各项美方资产远不足以供业务独立运转，则应当不会构成一项“美国业务”。但是，实践中很多交易不具备这样的明显特征。
美国政府在各投资方设立合资企业后对本次交易进行审查，投资方于2019年12月向CFIUS提交主动申报。审查中，CFIUS关注EBH此前与美国国防部合作中的遗留工作、交易中的技术转让情况以及合资企业的其他问题。最终，CFIUS认为交易可能威胁美国国家安全，并要求各方终止EBH继续参与该合资项目。投资方均表示他们将继续与CFIUS合作以达成最终的相关协议条款。
这一事件无疑将在早已动荡的中美商业环境中掀起更多波澜。但也应注意该事件中并非所有相关事实均被公开，因此无需仅以此做普遍性推论。
本期60秒速读启示：该事件带来一定消极信号，但各公司无需根据单一事件做出过度普遍性预测。
60-Second CFIUS | CFIUS seeks termination of a US-China joint venture
In what may be the first action of this type, CFIUS has asked the U.S. party to a China joint venture to terminate its role in the project.
Ekso Bionics Holdings, Inc., a Nasdaq-listed medical devices company, announced a joint venture in January 2019 with a Zhejiang venture capital investment company and another partner to develop, sell and support exoskeleton products in Asia. The US party reportedly was to contribute a license to manufacturing technology together with its PRC patent rights; the other parties were to contribute cash.
CFIUS applies to any transaction “by or with any foreign person that could result in foreign control of any U.S. business, including such a transaction carried out through a joint venture.” In the joint venture context, this generally means the parties must take care not to contribute into the joint venture things that, taken together, might constitute a “U.S. business.”
CFIUS regulations suggest a technology license by itself is not a U.S. business. The regulations contain an example in which a license to a foreign party of technology needed to manufacture armored personnel carriers, even when coupled with the sale of the U.S. licensor’s production of APCs, did not constitute the acquisition of a U.S. business. Of course, any technology license would be subject to scrutiny under export regulatory laws, but that is a separate question.
On the other hand, the regulations suggest that “land and equipment … [together with] intellectual property, other proprietary information, and other intangible assets,” when contributed to a joint venture, could constitute a U.S. business. Practitioners generally view the contribution of U.S. personnel to be problematical as well. Where the U.S. assets are not even remotely sufficient to be operated independently as a business, they shouldn’t constitute a “U.S. business.” Many deals do not present such a bright line, however.
After the parties established their joint venture, the U.S. government inquired into the deal, and in December 2019 the parties made a voluntary filing with CFIUS. In its review, CFIUS focused on Ekso’s legacy work for the US government as well as technology transfers and other aspects of the joint venture. At the end of the day, CFIUS was not able to resolve its national security concerns and asked the parties to voluntarily terminate Ekso’s role in the joint venture. The parties have indicated they will work with CFIUS to finalize the terms of an agreement to do so.
This development is sure to cause more waves in an already choppy US-China business environment. But parties should be careful not to generalize from one case, where not all the facts are known.
The 60-second takeaway is this is not positive news, but companies should be careful not to over-generalize from one case.